Right of the Directors of a Corporation to File for it a Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 2 
January 1917 
Right of the Directors of a Corporation to File for it a Voluntary 
Petition in Bankruptcy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Right of the Directors of a Corporation to File for it a Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy, 2 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 
097 (1917). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol2/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Published Quarterly During the University Year by the
Undergraduates of Washington University Law School.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
CARLEs NAGEL JOHN F. LzE
EvWARD C. ELIOT WALTER D. COLES
RICHARD L GOODE FREDERIcK N. JunsoN
JAMES A. SEDDON FRANKLIN FEsRIs
THEODORE RASSIEUR P. TAYLOR BRYAN
EDITORIAL BOARD
EumEr T. CARTER JOSEPH L. PATTON
JOSEPH J. GRAvELY MAURICE S. WEEKS
BUSINESS MANAGER
HARRY L. THOMAS.
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
CHARLES P. WILLIAMS TYRREL WIU.LIAMS
NOTES.
RIGHT OF THE DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION
TO FILE FOR IT A VOLUNTARY PETI-
TION IN BANKRUPTCY
In discussing the right of the directors of a company to file for it
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy the first question that presents it-
self is as to what authorization from the stockholders, or what cir-
cumstances dispensing with the need of such authorization, must be
present.
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In respect to corporations, there being no special provisions in the
bankruptcy act, reference must be made to the state statute controlling
the authority of officers and directors of corporations to dispose of
the property of the corporation for the benefit of its creditors. Under
the New York statute, a board of directors alone has power to deter-
mine whether a general assignment for the benefit of creditors shall
be made, and where a petition of a corporation to be adjudged a vol-
untary bankrupt does not show that corporate action has been taken
authorizing the president of the corporation to execute and file the
petition, the court has no jurisdiction to adjudge the corporation a
voluntary bankrupt. (In re Jefferson Casket Co., 182 Fed. 689.)
In the case of In re Foster, 210 Fed. (Pa.) 652, the court held that
the directors of the Pennsylvania corporation had without special
authority of the stockholders, a right to file a petition to have the cor-
poration adjudged a bankrupt, and that this right was governed by
the state law. The court said: "It must be conceded that if the di-
rectors of the corporation have power to make a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors without authority from the stockholders,
they have equal power to file a petition in bankruptcy."
InIn re Guanacevi Tunnel Co. (1912) 201 Fed. 316, it is said that
a voluntary petition for adjudication as a bankrupt is the same thing
in effect as a general assignment for benefit of creditors or an appli-
cation for a receiver, And in In re Kenwood Ice Company, 189 Fed.
(Minn.) 525, the court held that the power of the directors to put
the corporation into bankruptcy was governed by the state laws of
Minnesota. So also the case of Bell v. Blessing, infra, holds that an
authorization to a corporation to file its voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy, given by its board of directors, a member of which practically
owned all the stock, is sufficient, notwithstanding Civ. Code Cal. Sec.
361a, prohibiting any assignment of the business, franchise, and prop-
erty of a corporation, unless with the consent of the stockholders
therea£f holding at least two-thirds of the stock.
If. the corporation is unable to meet its current obligations, in the
absence of any restriction by statute, or by charter, or by-laws, the
power of the board to make a general assignment is presumed.
Thus in the case of Hutchinson vs. Green, 91 Mo. 367, there was
an assignment for the benefit of creditors by the directors, and the
court held that it was the duty of the directors to care for its creditors
when it became embarrassed and unable to meet its obligations in the
usual course of business, that it is competent for the directors to
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make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and this they may
do, not only without the consent, but even against the expresed will
of the stockholders; that where there is no restriction within the stat-
ute, articles of association, or by-laws, as to the disposition of the
property of a corporation by the directors, the latter and they alone
are the proper parties to make the assignment.
In the case of Banta vs. Hubbell, 167 Mo. App. 38, the court said:
"When a corporation becomes insolvent in the sense in which we shall
define that term, it is the duty of the directors to make an assignment
for the benefit of creditors." "When a corporation possesses assets
substantially in excess of its liabilities to creditors, is not embarrassed
by demands of creditors, and is a going concern, apparently endowed
with sufficient resources and vitality to continue its business indefi-
nitely and successfully, it is not insolvent, so far as creditors are
concerned, though its capital stock be impaired." "So long as there
is a reasonable prospect of success and the corporation is able to re-
spond to the lawful demands of creditors, it should not be pronounced
insolvent." "When it becomes merely 'a nominal, inert body' it may
generally be considered an insolvent corporation. In other words,
when a corporation s assets are insufficient for the payment of its
debts, and it has ceased business, or has taken, or is in the act of tak-
ing, a step which will practically incapacitate it for conducting the
corporate enterprise with reasonable prospect of success, or its em-
barrassments are such that early suspension and failure must neces-
sarily ensue, then such corporation must be pronounced insolvent."
It would seem to be the effect of the decisions that insolvency, such
as is described in the last case examined, is a prerequisite to any
rightful filing of a voluntary petition for the company by the direc-
tors. It will be noted, however, that it is impossible to define the
meaning of insolvency, used in this connection, with any degree of
clearness, and it would seem that even in cases where the assets of
the company are considerably greater than its liabilities, but where
there is no further prospect of doing business-or where there are
in addition liquidated debts, of smaller amount than the quick assets,
large unliquidated claims against the company, and its affairs are in
unsettled condition-that the policy of the law would favor the right
of the directors to use the bankruptcy courts as a means of winding
up the affairs, or liquidating the assets of, the concern. We shall
presently note some cases involving such situations.
When the question of the power of the directors is settled there re-
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mains a further question as to whether the corporation must, by the
terms of the,bankruptcy act, be insolvent, before its voluntary peti-
tion may be filed. Under Chapter 3, Section 3 of the Bankruptcy
Act, defining acts of bankruptcy, there are five sub-sections. Under
sections two, three, and the second part of four, insolvency is a
necessary element to the act of bankruptcy. Under one, and first
part of four, and under five, insolvency is not necessary. The fifth
sub-section requires the petitioner to state his inabiilty to pay his
debts, and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground.
By the first part of sub-section four, "a general assignment for the
benefit of his creditors" is made an act of bankruptcy, and by sub-
section one, his act, where he has concealed, transferred, etc., any
part of his property with intent to hinder or defraud his creditors.
in West vs. Lea, 174 U. S. 590, 43 L. Ed. 1098, the court held
that the separate sections of the act were to be considered separately,
and that under some of them as explained above, insolvency is not
prerequisite to filing a petition either voluntarily or involuntarily.
To the same effect is Bray vs. Cobb, 91 Fed. 102, and In re Chappell,
113 Fed. 545: A solvent individual may thus file a voluntary peti-
tion. Similarly it would appear that probably a corporation may be-
come a voluntary bankrupt under the act without proving insolvency.
In the case of Bell v. Blessing, 225 Fed. 750, it was held that a cor-
poration, not a municipal railroad, insurance, or banking corporation,
has, under Bankr. Act. July 1, 1898, c. 541, Sec. 4a, 30 Stat. 547
(Comp. St. 1913, Sec. 9588), the same privilege of becoming a volun-
tary bankrupt as an individual, and its petition therefor need only
show that it owed debts which it is unable to pay in full, and that it
is willing to surrender its property for the benefit of its creditors;
and a resolution of the board of directors, authorizing the filing of a
voluntary petition, need not authorize, in conformity with section 3,
subd. 5 (Comp. St. 1913, Sec. 9587), an admission in writing on the
part of the corporation of its inability to pay its debts and its will-
ingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground, and a resolution
authorizing its cashier, treasurer, and bookkeeper to prosecute in the
name of the corporation a petition in bankruptcy to final discharge,
is sufficient to authorize the corporation to proceed as a voluntary
bankrupt to obtain its discharge.
It may be here noted that a creditor has not in any case a right to
oppose the filing of a voluntary petition, (In re Ives, 113 Fed. 913-
14, In re Jehy, 94 Fed. 638), so that cases like In re Duplex Radiator
Co., 142 Fed. 906, where the insolvency of the corporation is ques-
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tioned by a creditor, and the question thus raised declared imma-
terial, cannot be relied on as conclusive.
Effect of Proceedings Pending in a State Court.
We now come to a question on which there are clear decisions
but which cannot be called settled because of the amount of litiga-
tion still appearing in respect to it. The question is as to the effect
on the jurisdiction of the Federal Bankruptcy Court of proceedings
in a state court, commenced prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy,
and covering the very property which is proposed to be dealt with in
bankruptcy. Where the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in
such cases they must necessarily get it from the Bankruptcy Act. So
much of section 67-f of the Bankruptcy Act as is revelant to the ques-
tion here involved is as follows:
"That all levies, judgments, attachments or other liens, ob-
tained through legal proceedings against a person who is insol-
vent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a peti-
tion in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in
case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the
levy, judgment, attachment or other lien, shall be deemed wholly
discharged and released from the same."
It will be noted that this section nullifies all liens obtained with-
in the four months' period, but leaves intact those obtained previous
to it. There are two leading cases dealing with liens obtained prior
to the four months' period-Metcalf v. Barker, and Pickens v. Roy,
both decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. The litiga-
tion in the first case lasted over twelve years, and its history is as
follows:
In 1889 Susan C. Dent (later Mrs. Roy) filed a suit in equity to
set aside as fraudulent, a certain deed to trustees made by one Pick-
ens in January of that year. In an amended bill Pickens' creditors
joined with Susan C. Dent and it was alleged that Susan C. Dent was
a judgment creditor, (the judgment making a lien) in the sum of
$10,000.00. Ten years subsequent to the filing of this bill to set
aside, that is on the 27th day of October, 1899, Pickens filed his peti-
tion in bankruptcy in the U. S. District Court for the District of West
Virginia, and in due time, was adjudged a bankrupt, the suit in the
Circuit Court being still undisposed of. In February, 1900, the State
Court rendered its decree appointing a receiver and commissioner,
who vvas proceeding to execute the decree, when Pickens filed a bill
in the Federal Court asking for an injunction, and that the property
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be turned over to the Trustee in Bankruptcy. This injunction was
granted by the District Judge, but shortly thereafter dissolved, and
Pickens' bill dismissed. From this order Pickens appealed, carried
his case to the Circuit Court of Appeals, to the Supreme Court, where
a decision was rendered against his appeal in the case of Pickens v.
Roy, 187 U. S. 177 47 L. Ed. 128. (1902.)
The second case, Metcalf Bros. & Co. vs. Barker, 47 Law Ed. 122,
was similarly an action brought by Judgment Creditors to enforce
judgment lien, which action was begun more than four months be-
fore filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but on which judgment en-
forcing the lien was not rendered till after the four months' period.
The court held the lien good under 67-f, in spite of the time of the
rendering of the judgment. Stated as briefly as possible the facts in
that case were as follows:
On October 2nd, 1896, Lesser Bros. (partners) made cer-
tain fraudulent transfers to favored creditors, and got receivers
appointed. October 22nd, 1896, Metcalf Bros. & Co. procured
judgments against the Lesser Bros. for large amounts, on which
executions were issued and returned unsatisfied. Then on Decem-
ber 17, 1896, Metcalf Bros. brought a number of judgment credi-
tor's actions to set aside the fraudulent conveyances. While
these actions were still undisposed of, on May 12, 1899, Lesser
Bros. filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and were ad-
judged bankrupts that day, and on June 9th, one Barker was
appointed trustee in bankruptcy. On February 6, 1900, the State
Court of Appeals handed down their decision in favor of Met-
calf Bros. & Co. for the amount of their several judgments. On
March .8th, the trustee in bankruptcy got an order from the Dis-
trict Court requiring Metcalf Bros. & Co. to show cause why
a writ of injunction should not issue enjoining them from tak-
ing any further proceedings under any judgment in their credi-
tors' action, and temporarily enjoining them.
On hearing the injunction was continued, and Metcalf Brothers
filed a petition to revise proceedings. Chief Justice Fuller said:
"The general rule is that the filing of a judgment creditors'
bill and service of process creates a lien in equity on the judg-
ment debtor's equitable assets." "Doubtless the lien created by
a judgment creditors' bill is contingent in the sense that it might
possibly be defeated by the event of the suit, but in itself, and
so long as it exists, it is a charge, a specific lien, on the assets, not
subject to being divested save by payment of the judgment
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sought to be collected." "As Mr. Justice Swayne remarked, in
Miller vs. Sherry, the commencement of the suit amounts to an
equitable levy (2 Wall. 249, 17 L. Ed. 830), or in the language
of Mr. Justice Matthews, in Freedman's Say. & T. Co. v. Earle:
"It is the execution first begun to be executed, unless otherwise
regulated by statute, which is entitled to priority..... ... The
filing of the bill, in cases of equitable execution, is the beginning
of executing it." "In our opinion the conclusion to be drawn
from this language is that it is the lien created by a levy, or a
judgment, or an attachment, or otherwise, that is invalidated,
and that where the lien is obtained more than four months prior
to the filing of the petition, it is not only not to be deemed to be
null and void on adjudication, but its validity is recognized.
When it is obtained within four months the property is dis-
charged therefrom, but not otherwise. A judgment or decree in
enforcement of an otherwise valid pre-existing lien is not the
judgment denounced by the statute, which is plainly confined to
judgments creating liens. If this were not so the date of the
acquisition of a lien by attachment or creditors' bill would be
entirely immaterial." "By Sec. 720 of the Revised Statutes, U.
S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 581, 'the writ of injunction shall not be
granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in
any court of a state, except in cases where such injunction may
be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
"We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of the District Court to
make the injunction order in question cannot be maintained."
The Federal Court can, of course, stay the proceedings where
they are begun in the State Court within the four months' period,
even where the suit is for the enforcement of a valid lien, and it was
held in New River Coal Co. vs. Ruffner Bros., 105 Fed. 881, that a
District Court has exclusive power to determine whether a suit in a
State Court should be stayed or not. So that under the bankruptcy
act which makes the appointment of a receiver because of insolvency
an act of bankruptcy, a State Court cannot, by the appointment of a
receiver on such ground, obtain priority of jurisdiction to administer
the property of the debtor to the exclusion of a court of bankruptcy.
In general, an adjudication of bankruptcy vests the bankruptcy
court with exclusive jurisdiction to administer the property of the
bankrupt as against any State Court which may have obtained posses-
sion of such property through proceedings instituted within four
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months prior to the adjudication, and it is immaterial that the pro-
ceedings of the State Court were for the enforcement of valid liens
not affected by the bankruptcy act. (In re Knight, 125 Fed. 35.)
We come now to that class of cases where proceedings in the
State Court are not to enforce a lien of any kind, and we will find
that in such cases the jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, once in-
voked, is exclusive. The case of Bank of Andrews vs. Gudger, 212
Fed. 49 (1914) is of this order, and the facts in that case are as fol-
lows:
By a summons dated April 21, 1913, and complaint April 30,
1913, in the Superior Court of North Carolina, four minority stock-
holders of the Cherokee Tanning Extract Company brought action
against the corporation and certain individuals, alleging fraudulent
mismanagement by the majority stockholders and directors. The
caption of the complaint included as plaintiffs "and all others, the
stockholders and creditors of the Cherokee Co., who will come in
and make themselves parties and contribute to the cost of the suit."
Insolvency was not alleged. The relief asked for was the appoint-
ment of a receiver, to take charge of the property and bring suits
against certain individuals for their acts. On May 5, 1913, a judge
of the Superior Court appointed a receiver, the order requiring the
defendant to show cause at a future day why a receiver should not
be appointed.
On the 25th of September, 1913, the stockholders of the corpora-
tion by resolution admitted its inability to pay its debts caused by
the differences between its stockholders and on September 30, 1913,
three creditors filed an involuntary petition against the corporation.
On October 28th, the District Judge adjudged the corporation bank-
rupt, the president of the corporation admitting the allegation of the
petition, and consented to the adjudication.
A motion to discharge the State Court's receiver was heard by
the Superior Court in the November term and refused.
The temporary receiver, and one Fain, who had been appointed
permanent receiver by the State Court, styling themselves "creditors,"
appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings by answer filed November
7th, 1913, setting up the proceedings in the State Court, the appoint-
ment of receivers, and possession of the property as such, and moved
to set aside the adjudication in bankruptcy. The motion was denied
and on November 10th, 1913, the District Judge made an order ap-
pointing a receiver, ordering him to take charge of the property, and
restraining the State Court from disposing of the property in their
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hands. The receivers appointed by the State Court refused to turn
over the property. After hearing the return, containing all proceed-
ings in State Court, the District Judge ordered Fain, the permanent
receiver, to turn over the corporate property to the Federal receiver.
On hearing of a petition for revision of proceedings of the Dis-
trict Court, Woods, Circuit Judge, stated the case as follows:
"The case then comes to this: Does the pendency of a suit
in a State Court instituted against a corporation by stockholders
for the protection of their rights, and the possession of the cor-
porate property by a receiver appointed in such suit, deprive
creditors of the corporation of the superior right conferred on
them by the Federal statute to have the corporate assets brought
into the Federal Court for administration under an adjudication
in bankruptcy when they have duly asserted the right and had
the corporation declared bankrupt as soon as it was known to
be insolvent and had committed an act of bankruptcy? It seems
clear that to this question there can be only a negative answer.
An affirmative answer would mean that the stockholders of a
corporation or the members of a partnership could at their will
deprive creditors of the right conferred upon them by the Fed-
eral statute to have the property of an insolvent debtor admin-
istered by the bankruptcy court.
"Such a case is entirely apart from those cases in which a
creditor has gone into the State Court and established or ac-
quired by his suit a legal or equitable lien on the property in the
hands of the court four months before the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. In such cases the courts have held that the credi-
tor is entitled to enforce his lien in the first court that acquired
jurisdiction. The distinction is also evident between this case
and those cases where the State Court held the property by its
receiver and there was no question of the subsequent coming into
existence of facts giving rise to the right to invoke the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Court."
The same court reached the same conclusion in a case decided
by it in November, 1916-the case of Graham Mfg. Co. vs. Davy, 38
American Bankruptcy Reports 118, and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion upon the principles in-
volved though upon a different state of facts, in the case of Rogers
vs. Levert Co., 38 American Bankruptcy Reports 240, 1916. To the
same effect is Commercial Trust & Savings Bank vs. Busch Grace
Co., 228 Fed. 300. C. E. K., JR.
Washington University Open Scholarship
